Fordham Law Review
Volume 77

Issue 5

Article 5

2009

The Pull of Patents
Brett M. Frischmann

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brett M. Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2143 (2009).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss5/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

The Pull of Patents
Cover Page Footnote
© 2008 Brett M. Frischmann. Anyone may make copies of this essay for noncommercial purposes so
long as the following notice is retained on all publicly distributed copies: © 2008 Brett M. Frischmann.
Originally published in 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143 (2009). Licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-NoDerivative License. To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 543
Howard Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA. Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th Floor,
San Francisco, California, 94105, USA. Visiting Professor, Cornell Law School; Associate Professor of Law,
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I thank all of the participants in this exciting Symposium and
especially my co-organizers, Jay Kesan and Katherine Strandburg. I also thank participants in two earlier
conferences at which I explored some of the ideas in this essay: W(h)ither the Middleman: The Role and
Future of Intermediaries in the Information Age, Michigan State University-DCL College of Law, April 7–9,
2005; and the Colloquium on Entrepreneurship Education and Technology Transfer, sponsored by the Karl
Eller Center of the University of Arizona and the Ewing Marion Kaufmann Foundation, January 21–23,
2005. For comments on earlier versions of this essay, I thank Julie Cohen, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Ronald G.
Ehrenberg, Mark Lemley, Oskar Liivak, Michael Madison, and Spencer Waller. This essay draws from a
book chapter, Brett M. Frischmann, Commercializing University Research Systems in Economic
Perspective: A View from the Demand Side, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 155 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss5/5

THE PULL OF PATENTS
Brett M. Frischmann*

INTRODUCTION

This Symposium aims to study how intellectual property laws
intermediate the relationships between different systems of information
production and exchange. The panel for which this essay was prepared
specifically focused on the relationships between university and commercial
systems. This essay focuses on a particular dynamic: the "pull of patents,"
which refers to the manner in which patents facilitate a commercially driven
demand pull on university resources. I
* © 2008 Brett M. Frischmann. Anyone may make copies of this essay for noncommercial
purposes so long as the following notice is retained on all publicly distributed copies:
© 2008 Brett M. Frischmann. Originally published in 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143
(2009). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoncommercialNoDerivative License.
To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/ or send a letter to Creative
Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.
Visiting Professor, Comell Law School; Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. I thank all of the participants in this exciting Symposium and
especially my co-organizers, Jay Kesan and Katherine Strandburg. I also thank participants
in two earlier conferences at which I explored some of the ideas in this essay: W(h)ither the
Middleman: The Role and Future of Intermediaries in the Information Age, Michigan State
University-DCL College of Law, April 7-9, 2005; and the Colloquium on Entrepreneurship
Education and Technology Transfer, sponsored by the Karl Eller Center of the University of
Arizona and the Ewing Marion Kaufmann Foundation, January 21-23, 2005. For comments
on earlier versions of this essay, I thank Julie Cohen, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Ronald G.
Ehrenberg, Mark Lemley, Oskar Liivak, Michael Madison, and Spencer Waller. This essay
draws from a book chapter, Brett M. Frischmann, Commercializing University Research
Systems in Economic Perspective: A View from the Demand Side, in 16 ADVANCES INTHE
STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, UNIVERSITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY 155 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).
1. At the outset, let me make clear: although I focus on patents, patents are far from
the only or even the most important institution potentially driving commercialization of
university research systems. Grant funding mechanisms and industry sponsorship of
university research are two important institutions that significantly affect university science
and technology research systems as well. See generally SHEILA SLAUGHTER & LARRY L.
LESLIE, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM: POLITICS, POLICIES, AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY

(1997) (studying multiple policy instruments and their commercialization impact). In fact, a
number of scholars "have argued that much of the increase in commercially oriented
university activities, such as patenting and licensing that has occurred since 1980 was driven
by contemporaneous shifts in intellectual property laws and regimes for funding academic
research." Scott Shane, Encouraging University Entrepreneurship? The Effect of the BayhDole Act on University Patenting in the United States, 19 J. BUS. VENTURING 127, 129
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There are many other important related dynamics to consider when
analyzing the role of intellectual property in mediating the relationships
between university and commercial systems. For example, there is a
substantial, growing literature debating the merits of commercializing
university research. The legal and economic literatures in particular focus
extensively on university research results and how research results are
managed, developed, licensed, transferred, priced, and used.2 The use of
patents within the university research system as a tool to encourage and
indeed enable technology transfer, utilization, and commercialization has
been lauded by some as a major success and criticized intensively by others.
Those who claim success focus on increased rates of patenting, licensing,
and commercialization. 3 Patents encourage and enable transactions; they
(2004) (citing Rebecca Henderson, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Universities as a
Source of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 19651988, 80 REv. ECON. & STAT. 119 (1998); David C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting
and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of
1980, 30 RES. POL'Y 99 (2001); David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Academic Patent
Quality and Quantity Before and After the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States, 31 RES.
POL'Y 399 (2002)).
2. The economic and legal literatures are voluminous. See, e.g., DEREK BOK,
UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
(2003); CAPITALIZING KNOWLEDGE: NEW INTERSECTIONS OF INDUSTRY AND ACADEMIA
(Henry Etzkowitz et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter CAPITALIZING KNOWLEDGE]; HENRY
ETZKOWITZ, MIT AND THE RISE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL SCIENCE (2002); CLIFFORD M. GROSS
ET AL., THE NEW IDEA FACTORY: EXPANDING TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES WITH UNIVERSITY
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL (2000); INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE:
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY
LINKAGES IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (Lewis M. Branscomb et al. eds., 1999)
[hereinafter INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE]; DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION:
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND
AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES (2004); Ajay Agrawal, University-toIndustry Knowledge Transfer: Literature Review and Unanswered Questions, 3 INT'L J.
MGMT. REV. 285 (2001); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Industry and the Academy: Uneasy
Partners in the Cause of Technological Advance, in CHALLENGES TO RESEARCH
UNIVERSITIES 171 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1998); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human
Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721 (1990) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome];
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights]; Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in
Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
Public Research and PrivateDevelopment]; Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions:
Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347
(2000); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual
Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); J. H. Reichman &
Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a
Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 315.
3. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A GUIDE
TO THE LAW AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 2-3, 9-10 (1999), available at
http://www.cogr.edu/docs/BayhDole.pdf, Chester G. Moore, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act's
Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J.TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151, 155 (2006) (supporting claim that
"[a]mple evidence exists to suggest that Bayh-Dole has yielded measurable and substantial
benefits at many levels" with evidence of growth in patenting, licensing, and
commercialization (citing ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, 2003 AUTM LICENSING
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serve as the focal point for researchers, technology transfer officers,
lawyers, venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, engineers, marketers, and other
participants in the commercialization process.
Without patents, the
proponents argue, potentially valuable research would languish
underutilized. 4 On the other hand, those who claim failure focus on
transaction costs, patent "thickets," deadweight losses, increased costs to
the public, increased secrecy, and shifts in academic norms. 5 Patents, they
argue, are unnecessary impediments to widespread, competitive utilization
6
of research results for which the public has already paid.
This debate is by no means resolved. Its resolution will depend upon
continued empirical testing of the various types of costs and benefits that
each side has highlighted. Moreover, the strength of the arguments offered
by each side will vary considerably across research areas (for example,
compare computer science, biotechnology, and materials science) and
across research result types (for example, compare upstream basic research,
midstream research tools, and downstream commercial technology). 7 In the
end, with the exception of some discussion of academic norms, most of the
attention in this debate is focused on research results-the outputs from the
research process. 8 For purposes of this essay, I would like to shift the focus
away from university research results. I do not address the arguments noted

SURVEY: FY 2003, SURVEY SUMMARY 20-22 (2003); Alfred R. Berkeley 1II, The Economic
Impact of University Technologies, 16. J. ASS'N U. TECH. MANAGERS 1, 7 (2004)); Opinion,

Innovation's Golden Goose, ECONOMIST TECH. Q., Dec. 14, 2002, at 3; see also BOK, supra
note 2 (arguing that the Bayh-Dole Act and patents enabled universities to do a better job
serving the public interest). Note that, in 2002, The Economist heralded the Bayh-Dole Act
as "[p]ossibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past
half-century." Innovation's Golden Goose, supra, at 3. Three years later, The Economist
acknowledged that the "costs [of Bayh-Dole] are adding up." Bayhingfor Blood or Doling
Out Cash?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2005, at 109.
4. See Kieff, supra note 2 (arguing that the primary role of patents is to facilitate
commercialization); Bayhingfor Blood or Doling Out Cash?,supra note 3.
5. See Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights, supra note 2; see also Eisenberg, Patenting the
Human Genome, supra note 2, at 738 (discussing the possible costs and benefits of providing
patents for publicly funded research of human genomes); Rai, supra note 2, at 88
(acknowledging that intellectual property rights caused a change in traditional norms of
scientific research); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 320 (recognizing that increased
intellectual property rights discourage traditional sharing of scientific findings).
6. See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257 (2007) (discussing the advantages of widespread competitive utilization over
centralized coordination by an owner).
7. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1600-15 (2003) (discussing how different theories are more relevant to different
industries depending on a particular industry's needs and capabilities). I should note that the
arguments I make in this essay about the pull of patents also vary across fields.
8. On norms, see Rai, supra note 2 (examining the role of norms in university research
and the impacts of patents and commercialization on university norms); Katherine J.
Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology Transfer, in 16
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH,
UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
PROCESS, DESIGN, AND

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005) (same).
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above about whether patents improve or worsen dissemination and use of
university research results.
Instead, I explore the manner in which patents might affect the type or
nature of the outputs produced, the process of research and other related
university-based processes, and most broadly, the university science and
technology research system itself. While patent scholars debate the impact
of patents on the management of university research, they pay scant
attention to potential impacts of patents on the university research system
itself.
Given limits in government funding of research-the primary driver of
the university science and technology research enterprise-universities
have begun to pursue and employ patents aggressively to transfer
technology, encourage entrepreneurship, and generate revenues that may
support research efforts. 9 While some universities have found tremendous
success in pursuing commercial avenues, the vast majority have not. 10 Yet
many continue to make participation in the patenting and commercialization
process a priority. ' I
Quite frankly, universities face incredibly difficult, complex decisions
concerning the degree to which they ought to participate in
commercialization of research. As Fumio Kodama and Lewis Branscomb
note,
Universities are struggling with the right balance between
utilitarianism and independence. How close should the coupling be[]
between the academic and commercial worlds? Universities feel they
should respond to the opportunity to benefit humanity through
commercial realization of new ideas and discoveries (while bringing back
to the university some needed unrestricted income). On the other hand,
they realize that they are almost uniquely situated to view both the natural
and social worlds from a distance, bringing perspective and 12perhaps
vision that would be eroded by being too close to the "customer.-

9. Bayhingfor Blood or Doling Out Cash?, supra note 3, at 109 (noting that "[e]ven
industry is starting to complain about a gold-digger mentality among academic
administrators").
10. See Aldo Geuna & Lionel J. J. Nesta, University Patenting and Its Effects on
Academic Research: The Emerging European Evidence, 35 RES. POL'Y 790 (2006)
(analyzing success rates and trends in patenting behavior at European universities); Jay P.
Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2169 (2009) [hereinafter Kesan,
TransferringInnovation] (analyzing success rates and trends in patenting behavior at U.S.
universities and citing various studies); Jay P. Kesan, Remarks at W(h)ither the Middleman:
The Role and Future of Intermediaries in the Information Age Conference at Michigan State
University College of Law: Tech-Transfer Offices as Intermediaries (on Their Own Terms)
(Apr. 8-9, 2005) (same).
11. See NAT'L SCI. BD., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS-1996, ch. 5 (1996),
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind96/chap-5.pdf, Henderson, Jaffe &
Trajtenberg, supra note 1;Kesan, TransferringInnovation, supra note 10.
12. Fumio Kodama & Lewis M. Branscomb, University Research as an Engine for
Growth: How Realistic Is the Vision?, in INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2, at 3,
13-14.
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Limited government funds may appear to be the immediate, most visible
factor forcing such decisions upon universities. 13 But there may be more
fundamental forces at work. For example, in Academic Capitalism, Sheila
Slaughter and Larry Leslie present a compelling argument that
globalization, changing economic conditions, and other macrolevel factors
are increasing pressure on universities on the whole to behave more and
more like market actors. 14 The degree to which such pressures are manifest
in university science and technology research systems requires continued
study.
In this essay, I explore how university science and technology research
systems perform economically as infrastructural capital, explain how these
systems generate value, and raise some questions about the impacts of
university patenting and commercialization. I explain the subtle demandside role of patents in the university science and technology research system
13. COMM. ON TRENDS INFED. SPENDING ON Sci. & ENG'G RESEARCH, BD. ON Sci., TECH.
& ECON. POLICY, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN FEDERAL SUPPORT OF RESEARCH

AND GRADUATE EDUCATION 21-47 (Stephen A. Merrill ed., 2001); see also The NSF Budget:
How Should We Determine Future Levels?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Res. of the H.
Comm. on Science, 107th Cong. 11-13 (2002) (discussing inadequacies in National Science
Foundation funding).
14. See SLAUGHTER & LESLIE, supra note 1; see also DEGREES OF COMPROMISE:
INDUSTRIAL INTEREST AND ACADEMIC VALUES (Jennifer Croissant & Sal Restivo eds., 2001);
JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN

HIGHER EDUCATION (2005); James Stuart, Comment, The Academic-Industrial Complex: A
Warning to Universities, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 1011, 1042 (2004). Another explanation can
be found in the dominant economic mind-set that has emerged in the past few decades. This
mind-set focuses on the perceived social benefits of commercialization, privatization, and
deregulation, on minimizing government intervention in markets, but ignores market
intervention into government and academia. For example, in his book, MIT and the Rise of

EntrepreneurialScience, Henry Etzkowitz suggests,
reorient[ing] ... the universities toward a commercial role was not intervention in
the sense of specific government measures requiring targeting of particular areas
of R&D for support, as in Japan, or requiring enterprises and research institutes to
make research contracts with each other, as in the Eastern European socialist
model. Instead, incentives were built into the research-funding system to move the
universities closer to industry, in their motivation and structure.
ETZKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 125. Etzkowitz is reassured that the government is not overtly
intervening into academia but fails to appreciate fully the risks of industry intervention,
which I discuss below. As Paul Krugman recently noted, "Decades of conservative
marketing have convinced Americans that government programs always create bloated

bureaucracies, while the private sector is always lean and efficient." Paul Krugman, Op-Ed.,
Buying into Failure,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at A35. Universities often are typecast, like
government, in a manner that marginalizes their social and economic contributions and their
respective roles in society. Along with a glorified view of the market and a pessimistic view
of government, universities are cast as ivory tower havens for (liberal) academics out of
touch with reality and the demands of society. Bringing universities "closer to industry"
may increase accountability and reduce waste, but according to whom and based on what
criteria? This is not the place to develop these arguments fully, but I raise them to suggest
that the commercialization question is not unique to the university research context but
rather is endemic to evolving notions of modem societal organization in capitalist
economies. To grapple with the commercialization question, universities should step back
from their immediate context, compare their situation with that of other industries and social
contexts, reflect on their role in society, and proceed carefully.
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and how the availability of patents, coupled with scarce government
funding, may lead to a creeping "system optimization," manifest in a slow
and subtle shift in the allocation of infrastructure resources and research
priorities. This optimization is not simply an adjustment in incentives, to
"better" align researchers' incentives with the commercialization objective
and thereby encourage more efficient technology transfer and thus more
efficient supply of university-derived technology to commercial markets.
While this is part of the dynamic, it is critical that universities take a wider
view and both recognize and evaluate the potential demand-side effects of
commercialization.
The role of patents in the university research context is not simply to use
patent-enabled exclusivity to fix the supply-side problem of underutilization
of government-funded research results. It is also to increase connectivity
between university science and technology research systems and the
demands of industry for both university research outputs (research results
and human capital) and the infrastructural capital necessary to generating
those outputs. 15
The U.S. government has made an explicit policy decision to allow
funded entities to obtain patents and thereby encourages their participation
in the commercialization of federally funded research. The Bayh-Dole
Act 16 enables universities to participate in the commercialization process,
but it does not obligate them to pursue any particular strategy with respect
to federally funded research. 17 Universities remain the agenda-setters and
must decide carefully the extent to which they wish to participate in the
commercialization process.' 8
As Richard Florida has argued,
"[u]niversities need to be more vigilant in managing this process" and
should "reconsider their more aggressive policies toward technology
19
transfer and particularly regarding the ownership of intellectual property."'
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows: Part I discusses
university science and technology research systems and explains how they
perform economically as a form of infrastructural capital. Part II explains
how patents were introduced based on supply-side reasoning without due
care for demand-side issues. It then describes how patents may contribute
to a demand-pull for optimization created by market-driven incentives in
the university research context. Finally, Part III suggests that universities

15. Fumio Kodama and Lewis Branscomb note that industry dependence on innovation
outputs from university science and technology research systems "has been accelerating
dramatically since the Second World War." Kodama & Branscomb, supra note 12, at 8.
16. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)).
17. Cf Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development, supra note 2, at 1700
(noting that university support for the Bayh-Dole Act was in part due to universities' ability
to control their interactions with commercial entities).
18. See Rai, supra note 2.
19. Richard Florida, The Role of the University: Leveraging Talent, Not Technology, 15
ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Summer 1999, at 67.
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may choose among different strategies and must carefully decide on the
degree to which they participate in commercialization.
I. UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH SYSTEMS

A university science and technology research system is a system of
productive resources aggregated within a university setting and used to
produce a stream of research-related outputs, as well as other important
outputs, e.g., educated citizens. The system is comprised of at least five
different sets of related, complementary resources, including
1. human capital, including complementary networks of
people such as professors, researchers, students,
20
administrators, technicians, and other support staff;

2. governance capital, such as rules, norms, policies and
other collective constraints that guide system participants'
behavior;
3. physical capital,such as land, facilities, and equipment;
4. intellectual capital, such as knowledge, information, and
ideas; 2 1 and
5. financialcapital.
Each of these capital resources is an essential component of the system,
although the bundle of such resources and manner in which they are
bundled varies considerably across universities. I have referred to the
various components of the system as capital because, aggregated together
within a university, these resources are used (and reused) collectively and
continuously as inputs into a variety of production processes, including
research, education, training, and socialization, among others.

20. Richard Florida focuses on the importance of attracting and aggregating human
capital within the university science and technology system as a means of improving its
performance. He notes that universities must attract the "top talent," referring to academic
research professors, in order to attract the top graduate students. Id. Florida emphasizes the
need to shift our myopic focus on research results (e.g., university-derived invention) to
human capital, in terms of both human capital outputs and human capital as a component of
infrastructural capital. See id.; see also SLAUGHTER & LESLIE, supra note 1, at 10-11
("Universities are the repositories of much of the most scarce and valuable human capital
that nations possess, capital that is valuable because it is essential to the development of the
high technology and technoscience necessary for competing successfully in the global
economy.").
21. The intellectual capital category is meant to capture the full range of intangible
products of the human intellect, regardless of whether the product has been fixated in a
tangible medium (e.g., written down) and regardless of whether any particular entity claims
ownership of the intellectual good. Intellectual capital often overlaps significantly with
human capital. For example, the idea residing in the mind of a professor is an intellectual
resource, while the professor himself is a human capital resource.
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Figure One: Simple View of University Science and Technology Research
System and its Outputs
INFRASTRUCTURAL CAPITAL INPUTS:
"

*
"
*
*

Human capital
Governance capital
Physical capital
Intellectual capital
Financial capital

PRODUCTION PROCESSES:
*
*
*
*

Research processes
Educational processes
Training processes
Socialization processes

OUTPUTS:

Human Capital: People
*
*

Skilled labor
Research community members
Intellectual Capital: Research Results

*
*

Basic -- applied
Commercial "- noncommercial
-I

h.

These production processes yield a wide variety of research-related
outputs, which can be grouped into two major categories-intellectual
capital and human capital. Intellectual capital outputs 22 are the intangible
information goods, essentially the research results, that may or may not be
embedded in some artifact (e.g., equipment design), be fixated in some
tangible form (e.g., written down), or simply reside in the minds of
researchers (e.g., tacit knowledge). Generally, when we refer to "science,"
22. 1recognize that the term "capital outputs" seems like an oxymoron, but it is not. It is
important to realize that capital goods are produced and thus are outputs of a production
process, especially when evaluating streams of cumulative input-output relationships.
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"research," "invention," "innovation," "technology," and so on, we are
talking about various types of intellectual capital that are outputs from some
intellectual process. These outputs are public goods with varying potentials
to yield positive externalities (or conversely, appropriable benefits) when
23
utilized productively. The types of uses may vary considerably.
Equally if not more important than pure intellectual capital outputs are
human capital outputs-people with (1) higher levels of education,
knowledge, experience, and research-orientedskills who are (2) prepared
for entry into the research community. 24 The importance of human capital
outputs is well-understood. Many commentators, such as Richard Florida,
have emphasized the critical role of U.S. universities in educating and
training (graduate) students-in creating "talent" that fuels the knowledge
economy. Education, knowledge, experience, and research-oriented skills
must be absorbed by students and consequently often are standardized (in
contrast with the cutting-edge nature of the research result outputs). Once
absorbed through the processes of research, education, and training, the
intellectual capital residing within the university science and technology
research system is disseminated and shared. Thus, research-oriented
education, knowledge, experience, and skills may be viewed as forms of
intellectual capital that are disseminated to students and used productively
to augment universities' human capital.

23. See Frischmann, supra note 2, at 364-67 (examining the importance of variance in
uses); see also id. at 365 ("A larger (smaller) variance in the distribution corresponds to a
basic (applied) innovation, representing a wider (narrower) range of potential applications
and hence greater (lesser) uncertainty as to a specific application."); see also Brett M.
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 917 (2005) (discussing infrastructural capital and the importance of variance in uses
as a defining characteristic); infra note 26 and accompanying text.
24. It is important to realize that socialization is an important aspect of the university
science and technology research system. Students are prepared for entry into the research
community, for example, by gaining familiarity with professional norms and ethics and
forming relationships with members of the community. Most undergraduate or graduate
students have limited real-world experience and very little (if any) experience in dealing
with professionals as a member of the professional community. In law school, for example,
we place a significant emphasis on the fact that students will be entering a profession, that
they will be members of the bar, and that a host of ethical and even less formal community
norms apply to members. The law school experience, in part, consists of a socialization
process that prepares the students for professional membership. A very similar dynamic
exists within the university research setting, although it is less explicit and less formal than
in the law school setting. Professor Katherine Strandburg has indirectly touched on this
dynamic. She explores the relationships between community norms and academic scientists'
individual preferences. See Strandburg, supra note 8.
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Figure Two: Simple View of University Science and Technology Research
System, Its Outputs, and the Marketsfor Outputs
INFRASTRUCTURAL CAPITAL INPUTS:

Human, governance, physical, intellectual and
financial capital

PRODUCTION PROCESSES:

Research, education, training, and socialization

OUTPUTS:

Human capital and intellectual capital

EXTERNAL OUTPUT

INTERNAL OUTPUT

MARKETS:

MARKETS:

Industry:
Continued research,
development, and
commercialization
Government, nonprofit,

universities, etc.:
Continued research or
other noncommercial
paths
(Also, note feedback

loops to top box. Rather
than feeding the outputs
as
back into the system
inputs, other inputs are
fed back, such as
financial capital.)

University S&T
research system:
Continued research
and development

(Also, note feedback
loop to top box.
Basically, the
outputs
fed back
as
into theare
system
inputs into further
production.)

Spin-off companies:
Commercialization

Both intellectual and human capital outputs generate value when used
productively as inputs. As Figure Two illustrates, productive use of these
outputs may entail use in further research (internally or externally) or use in
commercialization processes (internally or externally). 25 For the most part,
25. The feedbacks loops are important because, in contrast with the outdated linear
model of basic research -4 invention -- innovation -4 commercial product, research may
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then, universities are "vertically integrated" with respect to the production
of research systems and research-related outputs; some outputs are
consumed internally while others are consumed externally. The manner in
which the outputs are used depends, of course, on the nature of the specific
outputs.
Viewed as an integrated system of complementary resources that
generate value primarily when used to produce various streams of researchrelated outputs, the university science and technology research system
26
begins to look like other forms of infrastructural capital.
University science and technology research systems are "sharable" in the
sense that multiple users may access and use the system resources to engage
in productive processes and produce research-related outputs. 27 Some
components of the system have infinite capacity (i.e., are purely nonrival in
consumption)-such as intellectual and governance capital-while others
have finite capacity (i.e., are rival in consumption)-such as physical,
financial, and human capital. It is the scarcity of these latter types of capital
resources that drives competition for funding, prestige, and resource
allocation decisions. As discussed below, to some extent, rivalrousness
within the system is what puts pressure on universities to optimize the
system for commercial outputs; the appropriable benefits (revenues)
progress nonlinearly, "going" in many different "directions"-downstream, upstream,
sidestream into related or unrelated fields, and so on-with more variability and
unpredictability than the simple upstream-downstream depiction suggests. See Frischmann,
supra note 2 (examining the problems with the linear model of innovation and its
implications for comparative institutional analysis). See generally STAFF OF H. COMM. ON
Sci., 105TH CONG., UNLOCKING OUR FUTURE: TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY

(Comm. Print 1998), availableat http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/science/cp 105b/sciencel05b.pdf; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INNOVATION AND
COMMERCIALIZATION

OF

EMERGING

TECHNOLOGIES

(1995),

available

at

http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/OtaI/DATA/I 995/9539.PDF;

DAVID C. MOWERY &
ECONOMIC GROWTH (1989);

NATHAN ROSENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF
DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR'S QUADRANT:
BASIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL

INNOVATION

(1997).

26. See Frischmann, supra note 23 (discussing different types of infrastructure capital).
I describe infrastructural capital according to three criteria:
(1) The resource may be consumed nonrivalrously;
(2) Social demand for the resource is driven primarily by downstream productive
activity that requires the resource as an input; and
(3) The resource may be used as an input into [the production of] a wide range of
goods and services, including private goods, public goods, and nonmarket goods.
Id. at 956. The first criterion isolates a set of resources that are potentially sharable at low
(or at least manageable) marginal cost; the latter criteria focus on the manner in which
infrastructure functions as generic (or general-purpose) capital to create social value and
further narrows the set to those resources that are more likely to give rise to an assortment of
demand-side market failures associated with externalities, high transaction and information
costs, and path dependency.
27. See id. at 956-57, 959 (explaining the economic significance of this characteristic);
see also Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE
L.J. 369 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase's Penguin] (on a particular class of sharable
goods); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004).
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generated by such outputs may provide the resources necessary to sustain
the system.
University science and technology research systems, like road systems,
basic research, the Internet, and many infrastructures, 28 are socially
valuable primarily because of the productive activity they facilitate. In
other words, the value created by these research systems is only realized
when the research-related outputs are used; essentially, the "value added" is
embedded in the outputs. Accordingly, to fully understand social demand
for this type of infrastructure and to assess how well demand signals
"manifest" in infrastructure markets, 29 it is necessary to evaluate the output
markets in terms of the nature of the outputs produced, the extent to which
such outputs generate (non)observable and (non)appropriable value, and the
manner in which value is distributed-for example, whether value is
realized only among consumers or whether there are external benefits to
nonconsumers.
Most university science and technology research systems serve mixed
commercial, public, and social ends by enabling the production of a wide
variety of private, public, and nonmarket goods. As a general matter,
university science and technology research systems do not directly yield
private goods for commercial markets, 30 although these systems generate
human and intellectual capital that may be used externally to produce such
goods.
University science and technology research systems produce a wide array
of public and nonmarket goods that generate or have the potential to
generate significant positive externalities.
This should not be a
controversial point. It is important to realize, however, that the human and
intellectual capital outputs of these systems have varying potentials to yield
positive externalities and, conversely, appropriable benefits. This variance
can be understood in a few ways. For a moment, put aside human capital
outputs 3' and focus on intellectual capital outputs-research results that are
pure public goods. The research results may vary in terms of their
genericness-specificity with respect to applications-that is, they may
vary along the basic to applied continuum. 3 2 The research results also may
vary in terms of the classes of applications-for example, commercial,
private goods production or noncommercial research. 3 3 Both types of
28. Frischmann, supra note 23.
29. I discuss demand manifestation below, see infra text accompanying notes 46-49,
and extensively in An Economic Theory of Infrastructureand Commons Management, supra

note 23.
30. Except to the extent that one takes the view that human capital outputs constitute
rival goods consumed in the labor market.
31. Human capital also may exhibit variance in the potential to generate positive
externalities.
32. See Frischmann, supra note 2, at 364-67.

33. Id. Note that there are important distinctions between basic and applied research on
one hand, and commercial and noncommercial research on the other. The distinctions are
relevant and important for comparative institutional analysis. See id. at 376-92 (comparing

intellectual property, tax incentives, government grants, government procurement, and
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variance affect the potential for positive externalities and appropriable
benefits.
As a general matter, most universities do not allocate their infrastructural
34
capital on the basis of commercial prospects in output markets.
Consequently, the range of outputs from university science and technology
research systems has not historically been weighted more heavily toward
commercial research. This is not to say that universities have not made
significant contributions in the realm of commercial research-oDf course,
they have 35-but rather commercial applications have not generally been a
central objective or priority. Put another way, industry demand for
commercializable research has not driven universities' resource allocation
decisions-at least historically.
By the same token, again historically, government research funding has
not been weighted more heavily toward specific commercial ends. 36 Yet, at

cooperative agreements); id. at 392-95 (discussing how different institutions target different
types of market failures associated with these distinctions).
34. As Philip Auerswald and Lewis Branscomb note, researchers tend to allocate their
resources-time, money, graduate student assistance, etc.-according to their "interest in the
question posed," which "contrast[s] sharply with a decision rule based on commercial
potential." Philip E. Auerswald & Lewis M. Branscomb, Start-ups and Spin-offs: Collective
Entrepreneurship Between Invention and Innovation, in THE EMERGENCE OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP

POLICY:

GOVERNANCE,

START-UPS,

AND

GROWTH

IN

THE U.S.

KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 61, 79-80 (David M. Hart ed., 2003) [hereinafter EMERGENCE OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP]. They also note, "A fundamental challenge involved in taking a project

from invention to innovation is accomplishing the shift from decisions based on the criterion
of 'interestingness' to one based on the criterion of commercial value." Id. at 80.
35. See, e.g., Henderson, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, supra note 1. As Jerry and Marie Thursby
note, "[c]uriosity-driven research can often lead to commercially applicable results by
accident." Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Patterns of Research and Licensing
Activity of Science and EngineeringFaculty, in SCIENCE AND THE UNIVERSITY 77, 81 (Paula

E. Stephan & Ronald G. Ehrenberg eds., 2007). In their study of Australia, Britain, Canada,
and the United States, Sheila Slaughter and Larry Leslie found that "all four countries
developed national policies that promoted a shift from basic or curiosity-driven research to
targeted or commercial or strategic research." SLAUGHTER & LESLIE, supra note 1, at 14-15;
see also id. ch. 2 (analyzing a host of national policy instruments). On "curiosity-driven
research," see Strandburg, supra note 8.
36. "Historically, a large part of federal R&D spending has been devoted to agencies
that have uniquely public missions, in particular national defense. Although the private
sector performs much of that work under contract, the government directs such missionoriented R&D because it, rather than private customers, is the ultimate consumer of any new
technologies that might result." CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, FEDERAL
SUPPORT

FOR

RESEARCH

AND

DEVELOPMENT

3

(2007),

available

at

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8221/06-18-Research.pdf. For the past four decades,
federal research and development (R&D) spending has been weighted most heavily toward
defense. See AM. ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., FEDERAL SPENDING ON DEFENSE
AND NONDEFENSE R&D (2008), available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/histde09.pdf.
Within nondefense research spending, the shares among space, health, energy, general
science, and other fields have varied over time. See AM. ASS'N. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
SCl., TRENDS IN NONDEFENSE R&D BY FUNCTION, FY 1953-2009 (2008), available at

http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/histda09.pdf. The American Association for the Advancement
of Science provides excellent guides to the historical data and funding trends. See American
Association for the Advancement of Science, R&D Budget and Policy Program: Guide to
R&D Funding Data-Historical Data, http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/guihist.htm (last visited
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times, government funding has yielded research with commercial
applications, and, as the history behind the Bayh-Dole Act tells us, 37 such
research was underutilized. 38 To solve this problem of underutilized
government-funded research, intellectual property took on a new role, to
which I now turn.
II. THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH SYSTEMS

There are many competing theories, justifications, and explanations for
the existence of intellectual property law. The dominant economic
justification for patents outside the university research context is that
granting patents over inventions provides the necessary incentive for private
investment in creating the inventions in the first place. 39 Information
resources face the well-known supply-side problem, common to public
goods: the inability to (cheaply) exclude competitors and nonpaying
consumers (free riders) presents a risk to investors perceived ex ante (prior
40
to production of the good), and this risk may lead to undersupply.
Essentially, in the absence of patent law, there would be a significant
underinvestment in (some types of) inventions because of the risk that
competitors would appropriate the value of the inventions. Granting
inventors patents lessens the costs of exclusion, raises the costs of free
riding, encourages licensing, and, as a result, makes a greater portion of the
surplus generated by the invention appropriable by the inventor.
In the university research context, patents have these same effects, but
where research is funded by government, the economic justification is quite
different. 4 1 Simply put, awarding patents for government-funded research
Mar. 25, 2009). For a discussion of a range of noncommercial priorities in federal research
funding, see DONNA FOSSUM ET AL., VITAL ASSETS: FEDERAL INVESTMENT INRESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT AT THE NATION'S UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES 2 (2004). Recent studies
suggest that federal R&D funds have become increasingly concentrated. Id. at 12 (noting
that recent increases in R&D funding to universities and colleges have been highly focused
on medical research).
37. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 2, at 86-93 (providing a detailed historical account).
38. See Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development, supra note 2, at 1702
(discussing and critiquing the argument that federally funded research was underutilized).
39. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 119 (3d ed. 2003); Mark A. Lemley, Property,Intellectual Property,
and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005).
40. For a certain subset of patentable subject matter, trade secrecy or other mechanisms
may provide sufficient means for appropriating surplus to attract private investment into
production. For this subset, patents may be justified for a variety of reasons associated with

disclosure. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and
the PatentBargain,2004 Wis. L. REV. 81.
41. I am concerned in this essay with government-funded research. Of course, a
significant amount of university research is funded through other means. See Pedro

Conceicdo et al., R&D Funding in US Universities: From Public to Private Support or
Public Policies Strengthening Diversification?, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE DYNAMICS IN HIGHER
EDUCATION: EXPECTATIONS, DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTCOMES 301 (Jurgen Enders & Ben

Jongbloed eds., 2007); Ami Zusman, Challenges Facing Higher Education in the TwentyFirst Century, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SOCIAL,
POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 115, 124-27 (Philip G. Altbach et al. eds., 2d ed.
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is premised on the notion that patents are necessary to facilitate postpatent
research, development, and commercialization. 42 That is, in the absence of
patents, government-funded research results would languish underutilized
(underdeveloped and undercommercialized) because (1) the researchers and
their host institutions lacked the incentives and/or capacity to further
develop and commercialize the research or to transfer the research results to
industry, and (2) even if transfer was feasible, industry lacked sufficient
incentives to invest in development and commercialization without the
exclusivity made available by patents in the form of exclusive licenses.
Elsewhere I have questioned the strength of these arguments and argued
that the classes of research results for which these arguments justify patents
may be quite limited.4 3
Rather than rehash the arguments and
counterarguments, which as noted in the introduction are the subject of
continued debate, assume for purposes of argument that the federal policy
of allowing federally funded researchers to patent the research results is
warranted. After all, as noted earlier, the law only encourages and enables,
but does not require, university patenting and participation in
commercialization.
Most analyses of the role of patents in the university research context
focus on the exclusivity of patents: that is, the benefits of exclusivityincreased appropriation of surplus; increased technology transfer, licensing
and related transactions; increased commercialization; and so on-and the
costs of exclusivity-deadweight losses; increased transaction costs; patent
thickets; and so on. It is important to keep in mind that the benefits and
costs of exclusivity are felt differently by different constituencies within a
university and thus may lead to internal conflicts.
Exclusivity is a supply-side concern that is relevant to assessing how well
markets will function. Patents improve exclusion and consequently the
supply-side functioning of markets for university research results, as well as
those markets for derivative commercial end-products.
The reward,
prospect, and commercialization theories of patent law take patent-enabled
exclusivity as the relevant means for fixing a supply-side problem-

2005); Peter D. Blumberg, Comment, From "Publish or Perish" to "Profit or Perish":
Revenues from University Technology Transfer and the § 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U.
PA. L. REv. 89, 99-100 (1996).

42. While the prospect and commercialization theories of patent law are technically
distinct and have slightly different foci, they share the same theoretical and practical
orientation. See Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent
Bargain MetaphorAfter Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1353-57 (2004) (noting that
prospect and commercialization theories derive from the theoretical work of Harold
Demsetz); Kieff, supra note 2 (discussing the commercialization theory); Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977) (discussing
the prospect theory). Some might argue that these theories are not focused on exclusion for
the purpose of attracting investment so much as for the purpose of centralizing decision
making and control in a property owner. In my view, these purposes overlap considerably
and can be tied back to conceptions of how investment decisions are made and concerns over
efficient supply chains.
43. See Frischmann, supra note 2.
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essentially, the undersupply of private investment in the production of
patentable subject matter or in the development and commercialization of
patentable subject matter that would occur in the absence of patent-enabled
exclusivity. The theories differ largely in terms of where in the supply
chain patent-enabled exclusivity is needed and of the degree of
control/exclusivity needed.
Patent theories take as a given that the market mechanism will best
aggregate information regarding demand for such investment. 44 Put in a
slightly different way, the theories are premised on the notion that private
investment into the production, development, and commercialization of
patentable subject matter will be allocated efficiently on the basis of
expected returns in commercial markets, so long as patents are available to
provide the necessary exclusivity. This certainly makes good sense, so long
as we are talking about private profit-driven investment. But what if
investment is not entirely private?
What if demand for research-related outputs and the allocation of
infrastructural capital to the production of such outputs is not best
determined by the market mechanism on the basis of expected returns in
commercial markets? What if demand is assessed more efficiently by
nonmarket processes-involving government, nonprofits, or community
organizations, for example? 45 What if we are talking about public or
community investment rather than private investment?
As noted above, university science and technology research systems
produce a mix of outputs, some of which may have commercial application,
many of which do not. How, if at all, does the availability of patents in the
university research context affect demand for university science and
technology research system resources?
In An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, I
explain the concept of demand manifestation, which basically concerns how
well consumer demand for infrastructure-dependent outputs translates into
demand for infrastructure. Markets may underrepresent social demand for
infrastructure where output producers fail to observe or appropriate value in
44. Economist Harold Demsetz articulates well the argument that markets efficiently
aggregate, process, and respond to information about what people want, and in particular,
that the price mechanism provides a remarkably effective signal to producers about where to
direct their investments. See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13
J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970); see also Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969); cf PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM

178-79 (1994) (making a similar point in the
copyright context). Compare Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in
Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 649 (2007) (challenging the view that the market
mechanism will necessarily aggregate demand information best), with Harold Demsetz,
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX

Frischmann's View of "Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights," 4 REv. L. & ECON. 127 (2008)

(suggesting that the market mechanism should be the default unless it can be shown that an
alternative (such as the government) would outperform the market).
45. See Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 27 (comparing market-, state-, and
commons-based production as information-processing systems); Frischmann, supra note 23;
Strandburg, supra note 8.
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output markets. Put another way, the market mechanism exhibits a
predictable bias in favor of outputs that generate observable and
appropriable benefits; to the extent that infrastructure access or
infrastructure capital is scarce, relying on the market mechanism to indicate
demand for access or capital may lead to undersupply of socially desired
outputs-specifically, public goods and nonmarket goods that yield positive
46
externalities.
In the past, universities had not directed their resources toward the
production of commercial outputs for a variety of reasons-public interest
missions, an explicit focus on education of citizenry, the "ivory tower"
metaphor and the ideal of insulation from market or government influence,
and so on. Of course, the grant-finding process itself has had and continues
to have a tremendous influence on how universities direct their resources.
Academic norms, reputation, and prestige mechanisms do as well. Yet
another important reason may be that universities had not always been able
to appropriate the benefits of commercially viable research in the absence
of patent protection.
Arguably, the obstacles that patents were introduced to overcomeinsufficient incentives and capacity to develop and commercialize research
results-may have acted as an important buffer between the university
science and technology research system and the marketplace. 4 7 This is not
to say that universities and industry did not interact. To the contrary, as
David Mowery demonstrates, universities and industry have a long history
of interactions. 4 8 Clearly, the buffer has been permeable over time, but
(arguably) it may have been sufficient to insulate system management and
resource-allocation decisions from the demands of commercial markets.
Although universities were vertically integrated in the sense that they
produced both the infrastructure and the outputs, the infrastructure remained
generic and the outputs remained mixed because the appropriability of
surplus in output markets was not a driving factor in the allocation of
infrastructural capital. Introducing patents into the system, along with a
host of other initiatives aimed at both enabling and tightening the
46. See Frischmann, supra note 23 (explaining this dynamic); see also Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patentsand the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1033 (1989) (discussing a study by Edwin Mansfield that found that

private rates of return were almost half that of the social rates of return such that, in
hindsight, private firms would not have invested in research and development of the
innovation despite the social benefits that were ultimately realized).
47. Cf Shane, supra note 1 (suggesting that the inability to appropriate returns from
certain types of research affected university patenting behavior and that Bayh-Dole led to
changes in such behavior at the margin).
48. David Mowery shows that the trend of increased patenting behavior by universities
occurred prior to 1980 and the passage of Bayh-Dole. He also suggests that, while the
relationship between universities and industry may have evolved (been transformed) in the
past few decades, transformation should not be attributed to the Bayh-Dole Act itself. See
David Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act and High-Technology Entrepreneurship in U.S.
Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else?, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra

note 8, at 39.
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relationship between universities and industry, may change allocation
decisions. While this essay focuses on patents, these other intermediating
institutions also may exert significant pressure on the allocation of
university infrastructural capital.
Demand for university-produced commercial research manifests in
market-driven transactions made possible by patents (e.g., licenses) and
critically, through other university-industry relationships, such an industry
sponsorship of research. 4 9 This creates a demand-pull that may lead to the
optimization of the infrastructure. In a realm of limited, scarce resources
and robust competition for prestige, students, and funding, university
decisions about how to allocate infrastructure capital may shift and
gradually become biased toward output markets that generate appropriable
returns at the expense of those that generate positive externalities (i.e.,
50
social returns in excess of private returns).
49. See Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and
the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141,
144-45 (2004) (discussing industry sponsorship of research and noting this effect);
Strandburg, supra note 8 (same); see also Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 341-43
(noting that commercial exploitation of university research may pressure universities to
"hoard" and protect information).
50. As I argue at greater length elsewhere, the market mechanism exhibits a bias for
outputs that generate observable and appropriable benefits at the expense of outputs that
generate positive externalities. This is not surprising because the whole point of relying on
exclusivity-whether provided by traditional property rights or patents-is to enable private
appropriation and discourage externalities. The problem with relying on the market
mechanism is that, in certain contexts, potential positive externalities may remain unrealized
if they cannot be easily valued and appropriated by those that produce them, even though
society as a whole may be better off if those potential externalities were actually produced.
See Frischmann, supra note 23; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 6 (explaining the benefits
of letting the spillovers flow). The market mechanism exhibits other biases as well. For
instance, because private discount rates tend to be higher than social discount rates, markets
tend to be biased toward the short term. Among other things, the divergence between private
and social discount rates can lead to overinvestment in applied research and commensurate
underinvestment in basic research. Further, incumbent market actors may act strategically to
preserve their market positions or to control the direction of innovation. These two biases
introduce further dynamic complications associated with path dependence and the costs of
changing directions once a path has been taken. Others have noted the possibility of such
shifts. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 2; Phillip G. Pardey, Bonwoo Koo & Carol
Nottenburg, Creating, Protecting,and Using Crop Biotechnologies Worldwide in an Era of
Intellectual Property, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 213, 225 (2004) (noting how a shift in
emphasis may occur away from basic research to applied research as universities look for
more financially rewarding research); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole
Reform and the Progressof Biomedicine, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at
289; Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 342; David C. Hoffman, Note, A Modest Proposal:
Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing a Broad
Experimental Use Exception, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1025 (2004) ("As the biotechnology
industry has diversified and become economically viable, the financial incentive provided by
patents has motivated many academic scientists to shift their emphasis from basic to applied
research." (citing Michele Svatos, Biotechnology and the Utilitarian Argument for Patents,
in SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 113, 122-24 (Ellen Frankel
Paul et al. eds., 1996))).
Notably, the empirical evidence does not confirm or refute claims that a shift from
basic to applied research has occurred. See Mowery et al., supra note 1, at 117 ("[T]he shifts
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As noted previously, university science and technology research systems
are inputs into the production of a wide variety of research-related outputs
that are used externally and internally to produce value (which may actually
involve internal cycling for continued use in the university science and
technology research system). There is a risk that the biases of the market
mechanism will "work their way upstream" and affect university science
and technology research systems. The most obvious manner in which this

dynamic can be expected to operate is simply by way of (infrastructure
capital) resource allocation-in a world of scarce resources (particularly,
physical, human, and financial capital), it should not be surprising to see an
emerging preference for self-supportive activities that yield appropriable
benefits that are fed back into the system.
It is very difficult to gauge this type of institutional change, but there are
some indications that the Bayh-Dole Act has had impacts on the
management of university science and technology research systems. The
Economist, which in 2002 heralded the Bayh-Dole Act as "[p]ossibly the
most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past
half-century," 51 more recently concluded,
Many scientists, economists and lawyers believe the act distorts the
mission of universities, diverting them from the pursuit of basic
knowledge, which is freely disseminated, to a focused search for results
that have practical and industrial purposes. Whether that is a bad thing is
a matter of debate. What is not in dispute is that it makes American
academic institutions behave more like businesses than neutral arbiters of
52
truth.

in these universities' post-1980 research activities cannot be characterized as a shift from
basic to applied research." (emphasis added)); Bart Van Looy et al., Combining
Entrepreneurialand Scientific Performance in Academia: Towards a Compounded and
Reciprocal Matthew-Effect?, 33 REs. POL'Y 425, 428-29 (2004) (surveying empirical
literature and noting that "the empirical evidence on this problem appears to be mixed[,]"
with some evidence showing increased applied research and some evidence suggesting that
increases in applied research "[do] not necessarily imply a trade off with basic research"); id.
at 436-38 (finding no evidence of skewing in their study); see also Shane, supra note 1, at
128 ("[T]he Bayh-Dole Act led to a shift in university patenting at the margin towards fields
in which licensing is an effective mechanism for acquiring new technical knowledge.").
51. Opinion, supra note 3, at 3.
52. Bayhingfor Blood or Doling Out Cash?, supra note 3, at 109 ("For example, a study
published in 2003 by Jerry and Marie Thursby, of Emory University and the Georgia
Institute of Technology respectively, showed that more than a quarter of the [licenses] issued
by universities and research institutes include clauses allowing the business partner in the
arrangement to delete information from research papers. Almost half allow them to insist on
publication being delayed."); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 341 ("Under Bayh-Dole,
universities have moved away from policies that favor pure research, both for its own sake
and as a tool for advancing higher education. As the costs of education skyrocket, and
government funding fails to keep up in many areas, universities have aggressively sought to
exploit commercial applications of research results, with an eye toward maximizing returns
on investment."). See generally Kesan, Transferring Innovation, supra note 10 (collecting
sources).
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Despite various expressions of concern about these types of impacts, the
empirical evidence is rather light, in part because institutional change may
be slow, subtle, and difficult to measure empirically.
While there have been plenty of empirical studies of university patenting
behavior and the performance of technology transfer offices, 53 there has
been less attention paid to the allocation of infrastructural capital.
Specifically, empirical study of the allocation of infrastructure capital
resources of the types identified would be quite helpful in evaluating
changes in university science and technology research systems. Among
other things, the datasets that would be useful include time spent by faculty
and graduate students on different types of projects; 54 the role of patenting
and related behavior in hiring, promotion, and tenure of faculty across
different departments; and the allocation of physical capital such as labs and
equipment to general-purpose or dedicated commercial projects. It would
be helpful to analyze such allocations over time and to identify and track
policy changes-such as adjustment in tenure criteria to encourage
55
patenting or commercialization.
Moreover, it would be helpful to examine who allocates infrastructural
resources within university science and technology systems and how such
decisions are made. Of course, there are many different entities with
53. See supra notes 8-9; see also Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of
the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development: Evaluating the Arguments and
Empirical Evidence
to Date (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://law.wustl.edu/CRIE/publications/mcmaniscommercializinginnovationpaper.pdf. See
generally MOWERY ET AL., supra note 2.

54. Of course, this may be a very difficult dataset to obtain. Some evidence suggests
that the "overwhelming majority of university inventions are so embryonic that commercial
application requires not only further development but also faculty cooperation in that
development." Thursby & Thursby, supra note 35, at 78-79 (emphasis added) (citing Ajay
Agrawal & Rebecca Henderson, PuttingPatents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer
from MIT, 48 MGMT. Sci. 44 (2002); Jerry G. Thursby et al., Objectives, Characteristicsand
Outcomes of University Licensing: A Survey of Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. TECH.
TRANSFER 59 (2001); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who Is Selling the Ivory
Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 MGMT. Sci. 90 (2002)). The point is
that commercializing embryonic inventions takes considerable time and effort on the part of
academic researchers and thus may reflect a shift in allocation of that critical resource.
55. W. Ronnie Coffman and his coauthors, for example, report that a faculty panel at
Cornell University concluded that the "University could better serve its internal and external
responsibilities by placing a greater emphasis on the development and commercialization of
university inventions" and recommended changes in university policy, including, among
other things, that the University (1) "[r]ecognize the issue of a patent on an invention as an
academic contribution similar to the publication of a refereed journal article for promotion
and tenure purposes," and (2) "[p]rovide additional and, particularly, more rapid financial
support (including for research) to inventors." W. Ronnie Coffman et al., Commercialization
and the Scientific Research Process: The Example of Plant Breeding, in SCIENCE AND THE
UNIVERSITY, supra note 35, at 94, 102; see also Scott Jaschik, A Tenure Reform Plan with
Legs, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Jan. 5, 2006, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/01/
05/tenure (discussing how University of Rochester engineering professors seek to have
patents used in evaluating tenure applications); Sara Lipka, Texas A&M Will Allow
Considerationof Faculty Members'Patentsin Tenure Process, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May
30, 2006, available at http://www.utsystem.edu/news/clips/dailyclips/2006/0528-0603/
HigherEd-CHE-Tenure-053006.pdf.
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different roles, positions, values, incentives, and needs within the
university-including university administrators, department heads, various
committees, academics, graduate students, technicians, and so on.
(Welcome to the world of academic politics.) 56 This line of inquiry is
beyond the scope of this essay, but I raise it to emphasize the complex array
of actors involved in university resource-allocation decisions and also to
on academic norms alone to safeguard researcher
question reliance
57
autonomy.
The role of patents in university research systems may reflect a changing
58
conception of the role of universities in an innovation-driven economy.
Many have observed, chronicled, and evaluated this transformation. 59 As it
has become clearer that innovation is the engine driving the economy, we
should expect pressure to optimize various institutions to support
Should universities be optimized to supply
innovation policy.
Even if universities should be optimized to supply
innovation? 60
innovation, what exactly does that mean? How would such an objective be
accomplished? Assuming that promoting innovation were our sole policy
objective, it is not clear what the optimal role of universities would be. The
current trend reflects one of many possibilities. Specifically, the current
trend envisions universities as active participants in the postpatent
commercialization process, and, critically, in the part of the process that
bridges the gap between invention and innovation. Bridging this gap is
critical to the commercialization process, and, as Philip Auerswald and
Lewis Branscomb have argued, a bridge may be collectively built by
university researchers, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and other
interested parties in a sort of collective entrepreneurship. 6 1 Of course,
building bridges consumes (capital) resources. Perhaps universities would
56. In The Uses of the University, Clark Kerr described the university as a "multiversity"
struggling to serve many different interest groups while retaining its autonomy. See
WASHBURN, supra note 14, at 2.
57. Professor Katherine Strandburg suggests that researchers themselves exhibit
significant autonomy; she focuses on the preferences of basic researchers and the differences
between homo economicus and homo scientificus; and she argues that the peer review
process serves the important function of manifesting and responding to the preferences of
basic researchers for "interesting" science. See Strandburg, supra note 8; see also Auerswald
& Branscomb, supra note 34, at 79-80. Professor Strandburg's inquiry raises a number of
important questions: whether basic researchers truly are making allocation decisions
autonomously, how their preferences are formed, the degree to which academic scientists
(and their preferences) adapt and evolve, and whether changes in the university research
environment lead to slow subtle changes in the "species" of university researchers. These
are difficult questions that require further study. See Thursby & Thursby, supra note 35, at
80 (discussing a few papers that explore scientists' preferences and how they may change
with incentive structures and lifecycle).
58. This may also be reflected in the grant-funding process.
59. See, e.g., BOK, supra note 2; CAPITALIZING KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2; DEGREES OF
COMPROMISE, supra note 14; THE EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY, supra note 34;
ETZKOWITZ, supra note 2; INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2; SLAUGHTER &

supra note 1.
60. 1 am doubtful as a matter of general public policy.
61. See Auerswald & Branscomb, supra note 34, at 79-80.
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better serve innovation policy by focusing on the wide variety of inputs
necessary for innovation, including both intellectual and human capital.
As a general matter, I agree with Richard Florida's argument that an
inordinate focus on innovation "misses the larger economic picture": 62
Universities have been naively viewed as "engines" of innovation that
pump out new ideas that can be translated into commercial innovations
and regional growth. This has led to overly mechanistic national and
regional policies that seek to commercialize those ideas and transfer them
to the private sector. Although there is nothing wrong with policies that
encourage joint research, this view misses the larger economic picture:
Universities are far more important as the nation's primary source of
knowledge creation and talent. Smart people are the most critical
resource to any economy, and especially to the rapidly growing
63
knowledge-based economy on which the U.S. future rests.

III. STRATEGIES FOR UNIVERSITIES

Some seem to believe that university commercialization is simply
inevitable. In Capitalizing Knowledge, for example, Henry Etzkowitz
claims that the "function of the university" has "irrevocably changed," that
"[t]here is likely no return to an earlier era," and that "the university is
changing its organization and ideology to accommodate its new role in
economic development. '64 Similarly, in EntrepreneurialScience: The
Second Academic Revolution, Henry Etzkowitz and Andrew Webster claim
that "universities are undergoing a 'second revolution."' 65 Not only do I
disagree, but I find such assertions somewhat hyperbolic. Universities, like
any other organization, must adapt and evolve with changing economic and
social conditions, but each university must determine its own "ideology"
and mission and decide on the manner and extent to which it should
participate in commercialization, entrepreneurship, and economic
development.
As noted earlier, the U.S. government has made an explicit policy
decision to allow funded entities to obtain patents and thereby has
encouraged participation in the commercialization of federally funded
research. Nonetheless, universities still must decide on the extent to which
they wish to participate in the commercialization process. As a general
62. Florida, supra note 19, at 67.
63. Id. at 67-68 (emphasis added).
64. Henry Etzkowitz, Andrew Webster & Peter Healey, Introduction to CAPITALIZING
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2, at 1, 16.
65. Henry Etzkowitz & Andrew Webster, Entrepreneurial Science: The Second
Academic Revolution, in CAPITALIZING KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2, at 21, 21. Universities
(and society more generally) should seriously evaluate such developments (and attendant
claims of inevitable revolution). See Jennifer Croissant & Sal Restivo, Introduction to
DEGREES OF COMPROMISE, supra note 14, at xi, xi-xii ("From the early 1980s through the
present, commercialization of research has been a consensus policy: Not a . . . natural
'evolution' of research and development practices, but a conscious reprioritization by a
broad coalition of actors.").
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matter, universities are not required by law to create technology transfer
offices, delay or withhold publication of research results, patent research
results, issue exclusive licenses, or be entrepreneurs. The Bayh-Dole Act
enables universities to participate in the commercialization process, but it
does not obligate or constrain them to pursue any particular strategy with
respect to federally funded research. Universities remain in the driver's seat
and may decide which road to take and at what speed.
There is no uniform answer for universities to the commercialization
question. The extent to which universities should actively participate in
patenting and commercializing research and to which a university research
system should be directed toward patentable research outputs will vary
considerably across universities. 66 Some universities may have sufficient
resources to resist pressure to optimize the university science and
technology research system for commercial outputs; other universities may
not. Some universities may in fact prefer to optimize, perhaps because of a
particular university mission, a vision of the university role in the modem
economy, or strategic reasons related to faculty recruitment, student
recruitment, prestige, or public image. In the end, with respect to patent
policy, technology transfer, commercialization, and entrepreneurship,
universities have choices and face competing incentives. How to proceed
depends upon the particular university's objectives for its science and
technology research system.
I envision robust competition among universities operating on different
models and pursuing different strategies, missions, and ideologies. Some
universities may actively engage in the commercialization process without
affecting their science and technology research systems. Other universities
may need to choose whether to optimize their science and technology
research systems for commercial research outputs or to sustain a mixed
system. In the various markets that universities compete-markets for
faculty, students, government funds, etc.-different strategies may be
successful.
Those universities that wish to preserve the integrity of their research
systems and resist the pressure to optimize need affirmatively to take steps
to manage conflicts of interests, to insulate decisions regarding
infrastructural capital allocation (i.e., decisions that impact the allocation of
the five types of aggregated capital resources to particular types of
productive activities) from the demands of the marketplace, and ultimately
to minimize (or eliminate) dependence upon commercial revenues for
sustaining the research system. 67 Those universities that wish to optimize
their research systems for commercial outputs should do so explicitly with a
full awareness of the risks and rewards.

66. See Kodama & Branscomb, supra note 12, at 14 (emphasizing the need to recognize
variance across universities).
67. As Katherine Strandburg notes, many of the concerns in this context stem from
scarce public funding. See Strandburg, supranote 8.
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Over the past decade, universities have paid more attention to these
issues and begun to develop nuanced positions on how to proceed with
patenting, participation in research commercialization efforts, and
collaboration with industry.
In 2006-2007, for example, several
universities and the Association of American Medical Colleges considered
various issues pertaining to university licensing practices and issued a
White Paper, In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing
University Technology.68 The White Paper sets forth principles to consider
in context when engaged in licensing of various research outputs, and some
of the principles bear on the university science and technology system. For
example, point one-Universities should reserve the right to practice
licensed inventions and to allow other nonprofit and governmental
organizations to do so-reflects an understanding of both the internal
feedback loops as well as external use by other noncommercial users.
Similar understanding is reflected in many of the other principles.
Moreover, the White Paper repeatedly emphasizes university mission,
academic norms, public interest, and social welfare. The White Paper has
gained considerable attention and garnered support among many
universities. 69 This is a welcome development in my view, though I must
note that it does not alleviate the concerns I have raised in this essay, and if
anything, makes them more salient.
CONCLUSION

This essay aims to make two related contributions. First, it introduces
the concept of "patent pull" to highlight an underexplored demand-side
perspective on patents. Patents "pull" (private and public) investment to
productive activities that would be less attractive in the absence of patents.
Exploring the role of patents from the demand side reveals that beyond
affecting traditional capital investment decisions, patents can have more
68. See IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN UNIVERSITY LICENSING
(2007), available at http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2007/march7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has also been active in encouraging more
enlightened licensing practices. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 306-08 (discussing
NIH efforts); Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and
Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice,
64
Fed.
Reg.
72,090
(Dec.
23,
1999),
available
at
http://www.ott.nih.gov/pdfs/64FR72090.pdf, Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic
Inventions:
Final Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,413 (Apr. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.ott.nih.gov/pdfs/70FRI 8413.pdf.
69. In addition to the universities and associations that originally endorsed the White
Paper (California Institute of Technology; Cornell University; Harvard University;
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Stanford University; University of California;
University of Illinois, Chicago; University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; University of
Washington; Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation; Yale University; and the Association
of American Medical Colleges), the Board of Trustees for the Association of University
Technology Managers (AUTM) has endorsed the nine points, as have many additional
universities. See Association of University Technology Managers, Endorse the Nine Points
to Consider, http://www.autm.net/source/ninepoints/ninepointsendorsement.cfm
(last
visited Feb. 15, 2009) (listing current signatories).
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subtle and perhaps pervasive impacts on organizations and institutions,
including but not limited to universities. This essay focuses on university
research systems; further research into the role of patents in other systems
where government and other nonmarket processes may fare well in
manifesting and processing societal demand is needed. That patents are
introduced into the "normal" market setting to create distortions is well
understood, but the impacts of such distortions upon priorities and the
allocation of infrastructural capital in nonmarket settings warrants further
study.

70

Second, this essay examines how university science and technology
research systems perform economically as infrastructural capital and raises
some questions about the impacts of university patenting and
commercialization. The examination is preliminary and intended to support
further exploration and empirical study. It also aims to make a conceptual
connection with other areas of infrastructure policy. The issues surrounding
commercialization of university research systems are similar to those
surrounding the commercialization of mixed infrastructure, such as the
Internet. These resources are similar in terms of the manner in which they
generate social value and in terms of the significant pressures they face to
evolve to serve commercial ends. In some cases, such as the Internet,
technological design creates a buffer that resists optimization and protects
the generic nature of the infrastructure. In other cases, the law may create a
similar buffer. In the case of university research systems, traditional buffers
between universities and the market seem to be eroding. In this essay, I
argue that this ought to be of concern to universities and society more
generally because it may lead to an optimization of university research
systems for commercializable outputs-a slow and subtle shift in the
allocation of infrastructure resources, priorities, relationships, norms, and so
on driven by the demands of commercial markets. 7 1 I do not argue that
commercialization of research results is inherently bad or undesirable. To
the contrary, such commercialization ought to be pursued when possible.
My concern is with the commercialization of university science and
technology research systems.

70. I mean to use "distortion" in a neutral manner to suggest an induced shift in the
allocation of resources that would otherwise obtain. See Frischmann, supra note 44, at 67072 (comparing externality-induced and property-induced distortions).

71. Slaughter and Leslie have referred to this as an aspect of "academic capitalism." See
SLAUGHTER & LESLIE, supra note 1.
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